[预告]04.15经济系Seminar:Optimal Mechanism Design with


  主题:Optimal Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Interactions

  时间:2015年4月15日(星期三)14:00-15:30

  地点:后主楼1610室

  主讲人:张 军,悉尼理工大学商学院

  主持人:何浩然,北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院

  主办单位:经济与工商管理学院

  主讲人简介:

  张军,加拿大皇后大学经济学博士,悉尼理工大学高级讲师。研究领域为微观经济学理论。论文发表在Journal of Economic Theory、Economic Journal、International Journal of Industrial Organization、Canadian Journal of Economics等国际重要期刊上。

  内容摘要(论文附件): 

  A revenue maximizing mechanism designer chooses a mechanism in the primary market to sell an object to privately informed entrants. The winning entrant then engages in Cournot competition with an incumbent in the aftermarket. The designer has perfect control in the primary market but imperfect control in the aftermarket. We fully characterize optimal mechanisms under general conditions. When the designer has “partial control” in the aftermarket, the constructed optimal mechanism is deterministic and the designer fully reveals the winning entrant's private production cost to the incumbent. When the designer has “no control” in the aftermarket, similar results hold.

 

 

(经济与工商管理学院)